Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d63a56d387b6e234…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

1.22 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000 First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 738978638e7c1a3eae85e24787bb5a74 SHA-1: 454a2cd748533670a79971d95bc176d61da51a73 SHA-256: d63a56d387b6e2346f8f9aa1d2cdbee5850f3c2f2aa02f7f85ca7dc77fa59b3e
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as a Microsoft Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities. This object contains a payload-like stream and an associated URL, http://www.day.com/dam/1.0, indicating it is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of a hidden worksheet further suggests an attempt to conceal malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is an exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload container seen in malicious OOXML samples. It is not assigned to a specific CVE unless the MTEF/Equation Native primitive also matches.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Hidden worksheet (hidden) low OOXML_HIDDEN_SHEET
    Excel workbook contains 1 hidden sheet(s) — hidden sheets are commonly used to conceal macro code, staging data, or intermediate payload construction
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.day.com/dam/1.0 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 12

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject4.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: 9220b03a07bd032df788b661a1160507949437e8f6875ef139b39241a475609c
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 818688 bytes
SHA-256: 2292bdc45fb5a0bbcf2ed74225b4e5853c3be84956cfd6ce7838eb1924d3ee66
ooxml_oleobject_01_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: ole10natIVe 809786 bytes
SHA-256: 3db0ef60169d3644c274a8e83df32409cc31741e0eb36b63cc357be4740e71f1
ooxml_oleobject_02.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 3700224 bytes
SHA-256: 82dfbdfc296b1effce557850d51c64868312e84b27522c09db9fa42fb3e2ec19
ooxml_oleobject_02_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject2.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 3668580 bytes
SHA-256: 079553d7ab4785a82155c9ad8a77bb8aac84989e54fd6ba4892bc43e2c43717b
ooxml_oleobject_03.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 10240 bytes
SHA-256: a67eb444031c35d1239e8b1c7851047d8dc4ecf61b454734ceace505dc1c03a2
ooxml_oleobject_03_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 8667 bytes
SHA-256: 59fb77315591a55324873430963abffa12244adc4996302250a87d8a758a5796
ooxml_oleobject_04.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Word_Macro-Enabled_Document1.docm 122520 bytes
SHA-256: 419e4d046fcd9a156130b7eb099b1adfb005f0e7d202478292bca8cedab7b903
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image5.emf 4584 bytes
SHA-256: e68178841052861ab8457d877ba6f3fb20bc38ee5ea3c12dab9b36e483e7b913
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image4.emf 7608 bytes
SHA-256: ee6645a3cadca8b94232450bc0268520daa504c403c0bf34b291f3a145b923b4
emf_02.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image3.emf 648132 bytes
SHA-256: 77213f6151a875938b66810002df4f4d3860eba6734bc520a435115c02778566
emf_03.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image2.emf 7337552 bytes
SHA-256: e47ca5b97dc4da34b3125e61d2ec840ef506be97561be73926c2dc459722b9e5

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