Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d61554ccf1984c60…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Created: 2021-07-06 09:26:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 825e8a901d19b96af7889459839c16e1 SHA-1: d594fe2952cccb358d0eda633ec2f951d1355dfa SHA-256: d61554ccf1984c600e67171cf850511ec946a5cf9b8a0c411201847982b15d6b
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded JavaScript stream and a link farm pointing to multiple domains, some of which appear to be compromised WordPress sites. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates the document likely instructs the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass gateway security. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to deliver a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9944

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://familycrawford.com/clients/3/31/31f1fdc6e90c562b7578e9c437f7c1bf/File/wedosawen.pdf
    • http://lexus-custom.com/js/upload/files/50370192714.pdf
    • https://insights3.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/915409aac2fb83952378447f65a95f5e/nexawapipogusedamamodawo.pdf
    • http://agcslohian.com/userfiles/file/vejajemunolebovexe.pdf
    • https://whitelightdesign.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/698eb2e5fc997eff9adce79b3c57b5a7/xalodizurokuraxedekave.pdf
    • https://gauravkankariya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7064ji6md45kbrq1qoks95qm33/fegefokowudaw.pdf
    • http://www.greenbriarpropmgmt.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d28d5e1e249190312b7e936df596a7ce/98354598921.pdf
    • http://bike-aholic.com/UserFiles/file/jowekovupodofafazewim.pdf
    • https://propbrains.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2ovsf8lv2gciv0rissemvnrfk7/sofolomelinisewikedolu.pdf
    • http://aliancegroup.su/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160804d129c93c---95384939302.pdf
    • http://constructionone.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160870e8b0bfd9---64820032737.pdf
    • http://iideree.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090b0f25ee8a---19757034765.pdf
    • http://stardentalcare.org/userfiles/file/26741288970.pdf
    • http://kennyre.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083ac4e99eb0---2024798482.pdf
    • https://www.cir.cloud/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160944ca927f4d---werokugotavenidija.pdf
    • http://bagandpack.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/25145d6fcb8b0c0fad4e24fdc4c03694/26097867519.pdf
    • http://www.gesas.it/media/mailinglist/file/18052890.pdf
    • http://birons.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/af35e19baabe238058d76e01dab435c9/vokanomepivetax.pdf
    • https://prikolnaya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c3384173afed0165b20f83528448344c/17940995038.pdf
    • https://lawpropertyconsultants.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2i0ed93c56n95isnamsbt0tsi0/17886619232.pdf
    • http://evola.it/userfiles/files/wozivawagefowexitidilozit.pdf
    • https://marblobath.com/app/webroot/img/files/1908707292.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=acl+lifestyle+ls522+manual
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ce21.bin
87bb4d042a0c04ad499733a643cf58d45d0fb6f446f2ddc1e2a528e3ecfdddb8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCE21 17448 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc00.bin
6a531e77044865578e8de33615662f9e7394dc1dab08ad42d96dabe94392dd82		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC00 17920 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000117b6.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x117B6 16792 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00012fcd.bin
7c3df4d8b879d51165e746f287eb0ddeeb7fc0cfc28a289e5adc58c1f77278b4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12FCD 10724 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.