Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d613dfd6cab6f9aa…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

10.9 KB
MD5: fecd086ea4879aa3e7b06eb1bcd0e102 SHA-1: d430f9aa7a2d64c8e26ad1ee091ba07d37e2511e SHA-256: d613dfd6cab6f9aa469698419a8f389add2c463bb7fe69e346632ee0039e2bf5
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for initial execution. The decoded object data suggests it's likely a downloader or dropper for a second-stage payload, though no specific URLs or hashes were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000010c3.bin
99bd453a66b35ccf8dbfadb9c1ff7422a7dd48a1e22b9e831f83cb54d82a1f2f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10C3 1772 bytes