Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5e1c2f94dbe9a7a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 55443c17ae610377db8914206f644d9a SHA-1: 54f502fc8d45420b39e30d92730a369c0621ee2d SHA-256: d5e1c2f94dbe9a7a5f53dbe3d39e572f8655682702520cf96230999b353544e0
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with high-confidence firings indicating automatic linking and update triggers designed to activate embedded content. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic confirms the document instructs the user to enable macros or editing, a common technique for malware droppers. While no specific scripts were extracted, the OLE object activation strongly suggests the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
f32c306c175bf3be915caa3a7c0e941c9130a7767a98180f97b9d9e33298e4fc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171562 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e41.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E41 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593e4.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593E4 12297 bytes