RTF malware analysis — malicious · d5c9ffe0379eaf8d

MALICIOUS

RTF

83.0 KB First seen: 2024-08-23

MD5: aebf403b5cddd306587068a601e95d0b SHA-1: 371fcd641067189024899d0aabe59b66255915e0 SHA-256: d5c9ffe0379eaf8d85d979a912bb12708eb3114905c5f4019257fc64c007af41

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, often to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001701.bin` `531d4466221408693d6966b75a855f2f2eb932b248db1a48feffd2952bb2ef2f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1701	1778 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.