Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5c838bad4a67a31…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

88.2 KB First seen: 2023-08-17
MD5: 4c7a8994282b9cd3cfb136447c82d340 SHA-1: 551d194ea0725703b3220492998fef33a8ea0f93 SHA-256: d5c838bad4a67a31d6d4dfdddb394ee475af925ac9df985995eae5de8429b991
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger the exploit. No scripts were extracted, and the document body content is unrelated to the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002a19.bin
5b553a57673bcdeeacd6c40d6f5dce3e04b42b34e17ee590202be92490f7a5cf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2A19 1795 bytes