Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5c6ea391e4a3ccb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.7 KB Created: 2020-09-09 07:53:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b03785174e8f5f65b898e259c8e89d37 SHA-1: 16d5dcbfbc41b56e9dfe5513b276259097b8bb0c SHA-256: d5c6ea391e4a3ccbcea958e0980a4ee2c3cb184d44c358ec8b05c4eba2d178b0
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a link farm and a specific malicious redirector URL, indicating a phishing or redirection attempt. The heuristic 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' suggests the document's content is designed to trick the user into interacting with the malicious link. The primary malicious IOC is the redirector URL, which is used to obscure the final destination.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/wix?keyword=inventory+list+template+excel+2007
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/4bb894_35510362e6f0411d8aa01272741461e1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/361045_100b1066edfb4cf2bdd939b634818d8c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a374b9_71863f800864420ea9d7364959c252a1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/76de1a_12ae32aeeedc4cd28c8bec1aa15d94ff.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3de8a6_58a4fdb82bcb48efa6acbe20458f2051.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7ea8bb_d1a6988bc33f480f9fba38bbdbb053a9.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f65175_5a07724bf1924d3381f66d28f6421911.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b13fd1_47d7fe88e21f4275b016272ef818df6f.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/8039/8486/files/silverpop_api_documentation.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4931/2665/files/22463136230.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7567/4024/files/pdf_to_word_converter_nitro_crack.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000969b.bin
972b96fe2f2ec79e8b267c3acfc196d699e87715c87b8bff898615a044a8449a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x969B 5600 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000a9a5.bin
bf6e373e3287da448833117b29b92a6b3c3530024f5a72da25aa57074294689f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA9A5 10604 bytes