Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5c4ddb8c3539c11…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

69.0 KB Created: 2021-09-13 11:24:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-09-17T12:38:26+00:00
MD5: d78da3c9e3af8de038e93247a6c74903 SHA-1: 26416be10a8961f4b888d84dd8757b4564ea4a85 SHA-256: d5c4ddb8c3539c115edd0c177c71077f16e7187cac0bde5b3e69947c8783a9fa
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This malicious Office document contains VBA macros, specifically a 'document_open' macro that is designed to execute automatically when the document is opened. The macro writes the document's content to a file named 'cadedex.hta' and then executes it using 'wscript.exe'. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads or executing malicious code. The presence of the 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' and 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristics further indicates a social engineering attempt to bypass security measures.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10009252-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10009252-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2aadc3a366845a7b029f6afb5fb92eb9b895adb0231d6121f95c33220ab69615		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 689 bytes

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