Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5bf70022cddc5dc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.89 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 3ccbb98251c07cf9155261016b6134f5 SHA-1: 06765b39eb5c9398a068b6815c7feffd2850f97d SHA-256: d5bf70022cddc5dcc04a74847b34876badd532ece66a09b46d4d81c2e0fb7b4f
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 indicate exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office. The RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics suggest that an OLE object is embedded and activated, which is the mechanism for triggering the exploit. The presence of OLE object data further supports this. The attack pattern is consistent with exploiting this vulnerability to achieve code execution, likely for downloading and running a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001d2e87.bin
6c9a953f54e8496a6000afb63644bb8a95bb5507e9632da15c54490706a0d048		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2E87 3732 bytes

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