Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5b776fce657afac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.3 KB Created: 2021-06-21 07:58:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 6e6cfe78df0431c8e552c78855ced972 SHA-1: ef6480fdca58f70d51ed3d7328c2fee7c4e21bf8 SHA-256: d5b776fce657afaccef7266ba94d73d20252115ab53b779ed913fd8dc6efdc46
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including brand impersonation (Amazon) and a lure to download a file disguised as a bank form. The presence of numerous links to potentially compromised websites and the ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly suggest a phishing or malware distribution campaign. The document's structure and embedded links are consistent with a tactic to trick users into downloading a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=rtgs+form+of+allahabad+bank+in+pdf+format.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://davaocarrental.com/images/file/dodesowabipa.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.suffaheducation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160922cc86b599---59412814053.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://myhomeinparis.com/userfiles/files/kitifujukegigi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.lbf-cosmetics.com/website/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cdad61ebe8---bofigumarekovolokiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.swx.global/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9e619a7c781d16278a9413dcd7a8c2a8/vofutoto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://narnivet.com/userfiles/files/83181954408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.popcaffe.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d113c81ec5d4f946642a2103f5da20ba/67267889058.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://makaeximworld.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e5899253e3---fabuvafifesadipisu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.mii.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c927f619d4418c52d9d99b9d6a357141/naxipixixakowegufosadij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agribusiness.pk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b8c11726b56---87515406492.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://casier-a-bouteilles.com/file/6555765752.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimpishio1bet.com/contents//files/26147090993.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vtracauto.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082dbcc171dc---kisavujemilujuzokimumi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://armagedonspedycja.pl/files/file/mokulugiwixuximogonamuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://walthamclassof1985.com/clients/5/52/52060312c10aa816a718e90a19a6a7a1/File/77464689539.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ms01bet.net/contents//files/33344630131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=rtgs+form+of+allahabad+bank+in+pdf+formatPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cab9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCAB9 5668 bytes
SHA-256: e15edd7ad673ec8442c92779f2fbeeb03600679e3849d318ced56dee50a2ea92
font_01_sfnt_off0000ddd1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDDD1 11104 bytes
SHA-256: 7e812eb5fdc851c7e03f3e26e63b622fb2382f76ff5c8f9e5f7d71bb0e2d0799