Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5b1ee56931730db…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.2 KB Created: 2021-05-22 00:44:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 03f6c97556704006b7529e78dcdc325f SHA-1: edaefde870951b7a0fd65f8906174015bce6dc9b SHA-256: d5b1ee56931730db213897a7267800ffb2434664589bd606df0a19f3e3b43394
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The file is a PDF document that contains a lure related to charging a taser, directing the user to a suspicious URL. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the embedded URL is the primary indicator of compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9989

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://resalured.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+charge+vipertek+taser
    • https://mitivowa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607237/delixad.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4471240/normal_5fec2cc8a4d6b.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4410447/normal_601fb1449c141.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426087/normal_6029fae34be86.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4408864/normal_5fe3e4aa0b274.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4373768/normal_5ffa31e8c6b18.pdf
    • https://fetepidema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134684810/43e3b2.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4495558/normal_5fd8d1112be5a.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4454968/normal_5fdf1c397ff74.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4449172/normal_605652c830223.pdf
    • https://kadorupadidugi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636929/b8935e06a1b09.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4416790/normal_5fd0ee761a5be.pdf
    • https://bimozasobo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398313/vekudo.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4418583/normal_5ffe884624947.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368777/normal_5fe02d1348860.pdf
    • https://xufetujada.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134745175/180073.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fc9e346c-da38-41e9-954c-84c94f7c026d/rumble_fish_sushi_mountain_view.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/befafuni/lovuwelajube.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/14586f5e-6863-4645-ab0f-8ed5501ec5e0/do_you_use_commas_or_semicolons_in_a_list.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lijopavexanuse/85069667611.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/96d30adc-18f4-4817-84b5-8c0f5ea69b3b/can_i_buy_roku_at_walmart.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/513e185f-c31e-4e30-9fca-01955d0996d4/xadebi.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4714c2ac-eed7-4afa-a3c8-205fb13195a3/gitefori.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xuzed/cerita_anak_muslim.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/satulibaren/information_technology_support_jobs_near_me.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000112f6.bin
b86b009826b48a0820dd69ad864dde0ef4fc693d4c2f12e2cb8bf7d88a9c7aa2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x112F6 2996 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011db9.bin
28207c2141617893591728383a81625c03971ceaa1a77610dc3c7c813173a98a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11DB9 5340 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012ffb.bin
3d127b66dbc3ffc7d855106cfa2907b4180b08d0cf1d9c36e25ae61ec9f79b43		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12FFB 11384 bytes

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