Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5aea7dfdf630bd9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.2 KB Created: 2020-11-30 04:23:38 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 2409b48e5fb57fdfea5a5a4a225c6fe8 SHA-1: 18b12c98ada0e1da19eaaee8a1aef19fe4cf2d0d SHA-256: d5aea7dfdf630bd9eabb8845b65f7f161c2bb05b996d8774a835c8cf71d0c594
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of external links pointing to disposable hosting services, indicative of a link farm or SEO spam operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links suggest it's designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/strik?utm_term=gci+cable+guide PDF link annotation
    • https://tejigenunonim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813632/musub_noxevatug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jutivodip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489611/ccdb02a0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rolewexuvuviwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134742390/kitip-milajutaf-kaguxamutovepa-pinotagiwojawud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368977/normal_5f881dba96a11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4452199/normal_5fc122add3914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kapebuzuzevasa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134587117/kominorojurezusiloro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415308/normal_5f9c53454ddb9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://garigewofunem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314314/nujavusubisunanew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/novipaliwid/97946836795.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1a6ca5f5-0ff3-4c45-b350-ec7d584358de/bakalusugaruk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/763a5897-0d9a-4715-97c1-ecbb5af47833/morevowexidawupipekeveka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e963.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE963 4592 bytes
SHA-256: eed78f44a17690f4477cd7ea21b1cf7a6a33252151e88292c0f1599cffe4e9b9
font_01_sfnt_off0000f8fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8FE 10908 bytes
SHA-256: cfc0f53aa5752cd2434bf1b534b6098a6acf963ea01a4fdbec2bdf72e7358d19
font_02_sfnt_off00011e28.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E28 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c