Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d597edaa02a35373…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.8 KB
MD5: e917a9b3e756b2d2c24b5362f03bbfdb SHA-1: d8b523c044a9681846df9f9a3142bda71a5f8d00 SHA-256: d597edaa02a35373d1ad9631fa71ed5dc76d3c9bb57e2e04e44f9845f67209c0
138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The PDF contains XFA forms and embedded scripts, which are common vectors for exploiting such vulnerabilities. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit technique is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
acd145fec12588828e5eb1c6da142d588d9746ae2b096d5772edb7576237b655
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101442 bytes