Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d57c0a2fe511205c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

66.0 KB Created: 1601-01-01 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 5d913d485af3cc464e86520a6b10ce15 SHA-1: bb9a510361219e3427f418ed934d281bc78bc45d SHA-256: d57c0a2fe511205cbbef87891aacf3af1dee588b9406dac5e843015878774e92
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, including specific markers and embedded OLE anomalies. The document body, while appearing to be a friendly message about macro viruses, contains references to 'virii' and a downloadable zip file, indicating a potential for malicious activity. The embedded OLE document and the presence of macro virus markers strongly suggest the use of Visual Basic for macro execution.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Win.Tool.WM-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Tool.WM-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 27,511 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 27,511 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.geocities.com/soho/8156/Chicken.zip In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00009c89.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x9C89 27511 bytes
SHA-256: 8593a6039b3069a817d2543400aa1b7f7b31ead261e06524337b800a4a7b685e

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