Win.Trojan.Vampire-13 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d5778748375b9c20…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

31.0 KB Created: 1997-03-18 21:29:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2015-10-13
MD5: ebce5080abd97920da3754211f7d4c20 SHA-1: 88d8ecab61479014df56494e17734780a3a6473e SHA-256: d5778748375b9c207ffac908209e6ea963c7dd07e2368651e17d1d752d4b4c24
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Vampire-13 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, specifically identified by 'TOOLSMACRO' markers and ClamAV detection as 'Win.Trojan.Vampire-13'. Embedded OLE findings and anomalous stream data further indicate malicious intent. The presence of AUTOEXEC, AUTOOPEN, and AUTOCLOSE suggests the macro is designed to run automatically when the document is opened or manipulated.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Vampire-13 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Vampire-13
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 27,410 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 27,410 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off000010ef.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x10EF 27410 bytes
SHA-256: 87e91f7e95dde8c1d893590b45baa59a1ab4314e563df326fc9a745e64648e2c
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Vampire-13
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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