Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d55c8890faa258f2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.4 KB Created: 2021-09-20 01:49:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: ca43f2690212bc74ef537c9df0838987 SHA-1: c49783775c2f2f85f28764efe05c26467377858f SHA-256: d55c8890faa258f2b6a1a59159a959ccf1961848244a2186ab219a217df67615
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1071.001 Web Protocols

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple links to external URLs, some hosted on compromised WordPress sites. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to run commands, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures and execute malicious payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=hackintosh+dual+boot PDF link annotation
    • https://samajsutra.com/userfiles/files/68901717211.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sharzh-ufa.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dc9f60874a90897bedfff43838cfc7f4/14464811058.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nullemont.fr/nullemont/ckfinder/userfiles/files/22719158105.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hotelrealerimini.it/userfiles/files/82008235194.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sbriz.ru/userfiles/file/tupijuvikizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://langfordfinancialservices.com/userfiles/files/40263822297.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kystar.net/filespath/files/20210910202142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://onhimalayas.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/51472358493.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ipekyolumedya.com/resim_galeri/file/65875756128.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nerezove-kuchyne.cz/UserFiles/File/16283744552.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://boschvietnam.com/files/usersfiles/files/94234796700.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vdgairconditioning.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613c6a0da1155---11605901583.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kfk-dekoration.dk/images/uploadedimages/file/6684829428.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.creativitaecomunicazione.it/js/lib/ckfinder/userfiles/files/8063089215.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://music-summer-courses.eu/upload/files/gaxabekogidufojujebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://masterpieces-mallorca.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aca84b251a913a48540f512cf72be592/zejipujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://immobilieninvestors.de/userfiles/file/65204165839.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ferdavagnar.is/images/fck/file/xosalifat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bradzo-ep.com/uploads/files/69057569186.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thegioixedap.net/upload/files/rovunusabezoxegolasude.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://clinicaveterinariasangiacomo.it/userfiles/files/60012024646.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lucidareemantenerepavimentifaidate.it/userfiles/files/93295149362.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kemxoithanhhang.vn/app/webroot/files/images/pages/files/98778198391.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d6b8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6B8 10560 bytes
SHA-256: 7752a6e2de5dbec1ca91c6dfcb7b90c9496874feca428bca49d6fbefecf4323f
font_01_sfnt_off0000eeae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEEAE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000106c0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x106C0 17352 bytes
SHA-256: ac8640c5e866afcb9d8f6527ed237e14b92a2888bd2225154de6c8c63c372946

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