Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d550fd5611e825e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

304.1 KB Authoring application: LibreOffice/7.1.2.2$Linux_X86_64 LibreOffice_project/8a45595d069ef5570103caea1b71cc9d82b2aae4
MD5: eedfe3a99a04fcb2f327e33e1b08d142 SHA-1: 838ab0cd5340e2c9a75edb225e63e0571870118a SHA-256: d550fd5611e825e1361b62acb57310286c1840953ca85640a41d092c24ad7dce
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object-related heuristics, including automatic linking and updates, indicating an attempt to exploit OLE vulnerabilities. The presence of ` ` and ` ` characters in the DOC BODY suggests potential obfuscation or malformed text, but the core content appears to be a formal letter related to personnel and insurance for a bank. The high-confidence heuristics strongly suggest that the embedded OLE objects are designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000037fa.bin
4f0af12874e2c4a71af970e4cdd6958bbbe8d4305599bf21a962f038f110842a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x37FA 38988 bytes
objdata_01_off00009fa9.bin
b57e59f0be386a07c68f96d133d6499980a40956416ebc8366c57aa203e1286d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9FA9 38961 bytes
objdata_02_off0001dcd8.bin
3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCD8 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off0001f27b.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F27B 12297 bytes