Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d550fd5611e825e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

304.1 KB Authoring application: LibreOffice/7.1.2.2$Linux_X86_64 LibreOffice_project/8a45595d069ef5570103caea1b71cc9d82b2aae4 First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: eedfe3a99a04fcb2f327e33e1b08d142 SHA-1: 838ab0cd5340e2c9a75edb225e63e0571870118a SHA-256: d550fd5611e825e1361b62acb57310286c1840953ca85640a41d092c24ad7dce
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object-related heuristics, including automatic linking and updates, indicating an attempt to exploit OLE vulnerabilities. The presence of ` ` and ` ` characters in the DOC BODY suggests potential obfuscation or malformed text, but the core content appears to be a formal letter related to personnel and insurance for a bank. The high-confidence heuristics strongly suggest that the embedded OLE objects are designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 3cd3b7d42e 51 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000037fa.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x37FA 38988 bytes
SHA-256: 4f0af12874e2c4a71af970e4cdd6958bbbe8d4305599bf21a962f038f110842a
objdata_01_off00009fa9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9FA9 38961 bytes
SHA-256: b57e59f0be386a07c68f96d133d6499980a40956416ebc8366c57aa203e1286d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off0001dcd8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCD8 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b
objdata_03_off0001f27b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F27B 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7