Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d535a8150144f468…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

26.8 KB First seen: 2022-12-20
MD5: 546a3dd8ff4ccbf10a5362e3aa3845ce SHA-1: 257740bbf5e16d7c7e2617b62064d190580c503f SHA-256: d535a8150144f468a53b616633283330b6a20c20006fd10983ed8e6f8f95aec1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Service Execution: Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, which is a common method for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities. The heuristic firings strongly suggest an attempt to leverage the Equation Editor exploit to achieve code execution, likely for the purpose of downloading and running a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000493f.bin
15274afd8091ba57243c6e15e14732f44b64820e7d5b40e21393cf82c5796f72
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x493F 1923 bytes