Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d52a6e8ae651e64e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.60 MB
MD5: 90fb6f14a6703fc496ed9a3c4ea48610 SHA-1: 84679ceb2fc5610a7e15151c8365847c25f69eb8 SHA-256: d52a6e8ae651e64eb221926af43f5bbcccf8555f2748a5a9e041a4dd5ed122d4
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. The presence of ".objupdate" directives indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation, which is a common method for exploiting this vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution. The file is classified as malicious due to this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
addd974bd620043cca0d00ff6fa65b78bb6b529d9556ce172b3adddfba474fc9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 55963 bytes
objdata_01_off000333df.bin
078f4826f1fd7ea74b366f8203fc5dc103f9012dddd7cede4b9d1d69bc7eed6c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x333DF 351910 bytes