Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d52920a59eb08943…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 7d4c600466c4287a74469d6388ff8f62 SHA-1: f55a231d3c610f9acb19a917102fd38c11ceff7e SHA-256: d52920a59eb0894348c908c6c6ecdb215dbc699b46999eba4d2566220d285531
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of malicious code. This strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000086.bin
2e177fb431702d04013199140315d034bd00c4767b7a47264cbfc24c249ea7a4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x86 1816 bytes