Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4f6d17fee89fee0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

360.3 KB Created: 2022-06-02 12:41:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-06-06
MD5: 381dbad0a88ac71aa3b59f547b9198ef SHA-1: f0241e5984f326184ca1471e3135874f71e66df7 SHA-256: d4f6d17fee89fee0c817eaa80098606ea149a11fc41230ec233e193f4f7be8be
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is a package that carries an executable or script file, specifically identified as a '.jar' file. This strongly suggests the document is a delivery mechanism for a malicious payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body is primarily XML markup, providing no further context on the lure.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
5b8604eca0444c35a3c1179bcb0256b36b24d351aec79710bab9531fab10a9a5		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 313344 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
3d119f5edbcc0852568f75ead536859e43e0fa8be29aa581db04a35384316734		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 308097 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
d5f4ea883812e415a52ffceb9e49118019ac53742d6fa02b92394053b89ad8f3		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5120 bytes

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