Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4d5fae9b879c0c8…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.40 MB First seen: 2026-06-20
MD5: 13305d691b36bfa11280e837a11b1703 SHA-1: 9adebf80bb0f35144521ada09d502f10bc44645b SHA-256: d4d5fae9b879c0c83ba217f7eab616c898413b8a116ed0186357be979be5b46d
222 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties In RTF body
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instanceIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/infopath/2007/PartnerControlsIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentTypeIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributesIn RTF body
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/typesIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-propertiesIn RTF body
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In RTF body
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/internal/obdIn RTF body
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsdIn RTF body
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsdIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/formsIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/cus�In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000a967c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA967C 81506 bytes
SHA-256: fe5d37aea6614815eb47595ea0f573c986983e63eaae85e9099c88438ec13591
objdata_01_off000dd7bd.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDD7BD 581466 bytes
SHA-256: 305172a69201fc5e78e6397a81d773f9e136355c069dd13f782d783929c72a6d
rtf_svb_00000009.zip rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116932 bytes
SHA-256: 28fc295dafc0bcccd998d6dc34a4e9ae47eb34cb74cb4b892eb6454833467799