Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4ca63a0241df852…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.32 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-30
MD5: e71fb1473574eff602a8f8a1ef401c2b SHA-1: dd5150036679b7a5b441c01c5cf5fca995466f8f SHA-256: d4ca63a0241df852dd25c935565b3f36db27cb7744d4b5da45c1d0a9d0963218
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is processed. The VBA project contains no executable statements, indicating the exploit is likely delivered via the OLE object itself rather than macro code. The embedded OLE object is the primary indicator of malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f81b5dc0f134bff67b32850863689811e3ff1dad6ed5cd918403c20cc4d6ab1e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00766282/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_02.bin
2f3e070a8dfc417cfad236a03f3c7feaa59f2d1b893da2e6feb0f07b70cdc051		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00766289/ole10nAtIvE 2192 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.