Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4c5903cb07c3bb8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB
MD5: 073bc1b5ef42fe4f4359c73ed88197cd SHA-1: 280d1b1da979fce1dd6c8c9cc35ecf5240ac08e9 SHA-256: d4c5903cb07c3bb884a31368a520efc119a8cd2537a9a57f853a6eaa07b8cd8d
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF exploits CVE-2007-5659 using a JavaScript stager embedded in an annotation's subject field. This stager is heavily obfuscated but ultimately decodes and executes further JavaScript. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063' further confirms its malicious nature. The primary attack vector involves leveraging a known vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D 273 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
df23f01489cd08bc899588290648f739d2644eed764995d7534ae2e058d738f9
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5058 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
e1062b8d61ce60f717b8b6165d2215efbc953a1a9689ab0817d5d532025440ed
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 79255 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).