Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4c19dcfdf324e90…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

17.0 KB
MD5: 9bb25e8d2402856607938a110bf84fc7 SHA-1: 2df5d20a690525a36e888a51f4b76a94abc70d58 SHA-256: d4c19dcfdf324e9082e355eeb3ba3fad59efc6461b79f42b01c210928bb17e0a
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The file is an encrypted OOXML document identified as an exploit carrier. It contains an Equation Editor OLE object, a common vector for delivering exploits. The encryption with a default password further suggests malicious intent. While no specific family is identified, the techniques point towards a delivery mechanism for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.