Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4c0ebbab5b4770f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

20.6 KB
MD5: 10aeee863eb3cca3f355d9b01b9c0a68 SHA-1: 059e50ed78a529f0443cc19dc76144ce328635eb SHA-256: d4c0ebbab5b4770f4f4d57a4a2156ba91277d12409d9c0a8701c5e81305843e8
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJAUTLINK heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000fbe.bin
8f9ca013a52a212b47fcceb7d26d691fb0ed5b5283c87e2e45f73ab2b5a2c407
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xFBE 1697 bytes