Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4a4e870f3dfc637…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.4 KB Created: 2020-08-14 00:52:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 959962cf0ba1e87dc6fb6e0f8a9c2e78 SHA-1: 665bb36d244296e10e149b0dce459b5a57a1d2a6 SHA-256: d4a4e870f3dfc6378de536416b209e5078bd6f8bee70ddddf4c80a5981fcf47b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file was identified as malicious due to the presence of a large number of external links, a technique often used to redirect users to malicious sites. One critical heuristic flagged a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body contains text related to SQL interview questions, likely a lure to disguise the malicious intent. The primary IOC is the redirector URL, which is likely the first step in a phishing or malware delivery chain.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=kudvenkat+sql+interview+questions+and+answers
    • http://files.marshcreekmini.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483219/nijilamuj.pdf
    • http://files.swe-rms.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302928/gikatofusenupo_vawepa.pdf
    • http://nixoxasef.brettstotalstumpgrinding.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681670/fe1fb86b35251b.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1648/6040/files/miwipadukatiwuzugugege.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7735/4143/files/75316570126.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/3196/2535/files/25485825002.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0033/8331/files/can_mobs_spawn_on_slabs.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/9045/0334/files/define_annotations.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5005/7373/files/37054920040.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8830/6586/files/pulse_secure_vpn_for_windows.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0443/9130/1286/files/apdcl_advertisement.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1943/6185/files/kebifiwuzik.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0697/5382/files/vedonelim.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8432/4770/files/android_app_stuck.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007762.bin
d94a5baa81c96781d418bb73e0ea12674763264483cdbb46c88a5c59290463bb		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7762 5128 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000088f7.bin
75deb7778567d1c4124366194552fc6b52b844db144e1965088c527f91b2a626		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x88F7 10588 bytes

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