Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4998d59f0427870…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1014.4 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 8fa3ca9e0aa6229c7e391f8a220f5088 SHA-1: 9c2868375e963178d68c318cea0d8e719b3e6c7c SHA-256: d4998d59f04278703617906848e57ba0e97cbf381c8752aeac0701f5edc2941c
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 strongly indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). The presence of OLE object data and updates further supports this. The embedded URL, while benign, is associated with the document structure. The file's purpose is to leverage this exploit for initial execution.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000f82a6.bin
5ff25c6ac0ac9cd6dc792d6e6954bd05de211215fce11602c606852793510595
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF82A6 3739 bytes