Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d46a992522a164e2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.5 KB Created: 2009-09-18 15:18:38 -08:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: 733a36193dbd2a61ab0926dd72f6eb6f SHA-1: 0b35bac706eab9e3dbca7a7a8d510ad0b37f97cf SHA-256: d46a992522a164e29c967f4d4d506144bdc63a2cab4ccdb0f06f3eaab0336a6c
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is designed to launch an embedded Windows executable, disguised as 'exc.pdf'. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0, indicating it is a malicious payload. The combination of PDF launch actions, embedded executables, and specific CVE exploitation (CVE_2010_1240) strongly suggests a malicious document designed for initial payload delivery.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\exc.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
exc.pdf
72d55a12c8f4c6f0b7201daf48af3ef41c44a119c127acaf87e9d09054ee6664		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 37 at offset 0x68CF 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0038_000.js
570f7acdce8a5c797f18421d22a30572560fb59edab6bc0b9cf9b594f29c271e		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 38 at offset 0x11576 52 bytes
stream_010_off00003bbc.bin
f362a81d8a369967948933bda27cfdd58fec4a98400be3d5d3a47649142a28c4		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3BBC 11284 bytes
icc_00_off00002e98.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2E98 3144 bytes

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