Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4207007488eef52…

MALICIOUS

RTF

199.1 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 353cb23b63cbf76a82e5ceb231e57548 SHA-1: 7b3f7f61ff511f0068a5162bc8d7504a13e39eb0 SHA-256: d4207007488eef52bb75a5ae4a56f99773744d22ec5d0c82a53eaaf02cfa62af
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability, specifically noting OLE object data and an \objupdate command that forces OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability for client execution. The presence of embedded OLE object data, decoded into a binary artifact, is the primary IOC. The attack pattern is consistent with a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00030b60.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x30B60 1714 bytes
SHA-256: 436df808a570cab9ece3f898efe80440e0051822f9a4f8328d6d0acea1e145e0