Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d40a2218d80c54a2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.8 KB
MD5: 24017c63b495a8b18608c90634d98d29 SHA-1: 80d023ef8acb210cbb5afa9c97d7858c0e1c2a9b SHA-256: d40a2218d80c54a26a9ce33f6343ea15f4f99ff6f4ba6f74b82a414d95729af1
198 Risk Score

Malware Insights

The file is a PDF document that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. The XFA form contains an executable script that is likely responsible for delivering the malicious payload. The embedded file and script payload heuristics confirm the presence of malicious code within the document. The ClamAV detection further solidifies the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 7

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-6136306-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-6136306-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
dc1e2b16844ad02552d59981d1b38874113b7e7a397214bfd3be8e7715f1cfb9
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC8 51291 bytes