Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d407be0656a3b89d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

226.9 KB
MD5: 46b4f0056a767a74604339f42c3b3694 SHA-1: 7735cad9bdfd2b3717d1d49241fcdfa840fe3f4c SHA-256: d407be0656a3b89dd4d6789df741efceeaaf7b756e10e7be13d2c5efb1dce9e9
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains multiple OLE objects, with one specifically configured for automatic updates (".objupdate"). This strongly suggests an attempt to automatically execute embedded content, bypassing user interaction and security prompts. The presence of "SE_ENABLE_LURE" heuristics further indicates a social engineering tactic to trick the user into enabling content. While no specific script or URL was extracted, the OLE object activation is the primary attack vector.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
6011942429d13f1c670c78d608d9c53a12dff6b2b3664065ac42f13c7a070b14
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19472 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a83c.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA83C 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bddf.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDDF 12297 bytes