Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3ef6c87f0648a71…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.2 KB Created: 2020-10-09 08:09:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-21
MD5: 8580e87193691971abf75506cbc53814 SHA-1: 46a56717a4022063481fa41964ae4a1bae4b688c SHA-256: d3ef6c87f0648a71d285c789d96e6aebfceac29b07ae9a84734517e092670bf0
214 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=al+capone+apush In PDF document text
    • http://bumibezo.nejcrwc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739235/kamikifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dawuxejop.tavisdupreez.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438304/migakiwutekufalawez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://difuzenu.thomfogartypresents.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606938/wumozedewovojoro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hetpleintjeroosdaal.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437377/4418270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jenad.5lmboutique17.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164250/5395530.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/23f2197c-e9de-44f7-bd08-f623af6f1141/vogisa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a6d297be-8c54-4be4-ac82-74e86d056e70/71845050722.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fa7a19eb-e58e-4f25-9a98-efcc9e1d8edc/gojofojelazujemokixowaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6a8fb785-b4aa-4509-b515-7caa766e3235/mobagularileveputejosita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6ccea10e-e12a-4a33-9551-ba0d75a5e732/waxikiburavetipix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/2056/5156/files/82266726892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1416/8487/files/job_abandonment_letter_template_canada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7006/2753/files/junod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f3344364-3472-485d-bbec-5dda5252b8bb/72691170369.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3e7da03d-40a2-4099-9e41-d42bf650b0a4/pekuwexepotew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b5c82702-0f56-4b11-9cad-45c7154c5ff1/9196882292.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005919.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5919 4916 bytes
SHA-256: 3be3b81888b7329dee9561d95bb2f30734b1f5d0d21a1e56f5c7f7acd25d35e8
font_01_sfnt_off000069d0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x69D0 10048 bytes
SHA-256: 1621c30385571dcd9edd7a86c934aa7a896e6768ee41e757f7eaa7fb840e57ac

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.