Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3ebe66a34753cb3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.5 KB Created: 2020-10-28 01:05:38 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: b70b2926bf5faaad69ed09a00be3d336 SHA-1: 3a8422da9058942f7ce5c29929e141e344540192 SHA-256: d3ebe66a34753cb3bfe3595677769289507e7da6adc05c95e4773593fb2e9e2e
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains and potentially malicious redirectors. The primary function appears to be acting as a link farm, likely for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malicious content. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of redirector links supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/pify?keyword=lobe-finned+fish+definition In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366331/normal_5f882167869b2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366324/normal_5f870e97d1cbc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375503/normal_5f8c2807255de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://repafajekojila.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305679/13a6c47.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://foduxami.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134452333/kuwakigivo-wivukubovevilu-kitokufu-sujoripukujon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://poxaneduwi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234601/5421757.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuxizakubapepo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134317428/xakavawigerog-ramozowuj-lerumaxuritozu-babisatonilad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wetuxabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873937/9cd0f6d43.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sofowalomutupal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310420/536381.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/8276696.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lajojixuvoporor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738555/pizemob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6aaa7294-773e-4136-a98f-4882017f17cd/taxojupere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9bcd84ce-5573-491a-950e-f0020f371725/75320052668.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/8225/9866/files/perricone_cold_plasma_sub_d_before_and_after.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0462/3876/1109/files/ibc_bank_application.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000730f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x730F 4772 bytes
SHA-256: 72dafa6fa3b90ffbfb5cd65dab9024d11ba2fa786a741e045803cca0a54c20ad
font_01_sfnt_off00008352.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8352 10048 bytes
SHA-256: 6b893f9af441651879669d958bc1d63708bef871d94bf5edee8813b8ac147e7b