Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3ce772b44506904…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.7 KB
MD5: 5beb508b242696bcebbbee8818e4ed9d SHA-1: 2d4580071df4452e362449b6c66adaf2e87eaee4 SHA-256: d3ce772b44506904d48a303ad8a6bcb319070ebf63b3bfb44dc1a2f34398963e
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to be activated by the user. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable content, a common tactic for malware droppers. This suggests the embedded OLE objects are intended to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
ee95ae870c1fe94f6c45aca41018a8138135deb4c6987ca2a33819f5a6c24bce
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19844 bytes
objdata_01_off0000ab42.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB42 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c0e5.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0E5 12297 bytes