Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3b2ac99e5388b99…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

939.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 78e0e8a80d64e2cfa4f6362d516b8fed SHA-1: d79c2e3eabf3e9f3cefc107becfb30717c442050 SHA-256: d3b2ac99e5388b99f652f6bae177ebb2c475e8e3b23298b8545eb6be37b32d13
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from the URL 'https://dealc.me/aSIiGK'. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious static findings, suggesting it may be part of a multi-stage attack. While VBA macros were present, they contained no executable statements, indicating the primary exploit mechanism is the OLE object.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00080800.pdf
112fde7144b386a09c7b3892ff360ea203413a8f414dd92198812e5c657d56a7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x80800 435200 bytes

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