Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d38a95c372f66ea4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPS

262.6 KB Created: 1601-01-01 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft PowerPoint
MD5: 519a68ba37ee8b3b3c68faaed7fc0ffa SHA-1: eab414c141657be587339dabb126be1260438a56 SHA-256: d38a95c372f66ea4e1595d7136bd8dabae71cccc610aedbe3d926b01b7a9b421
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a PowerPoint file (PPS) containing an embedded PE executable. Heuristics indicate the use of API hashing for resolving functions like CreateProcess, ShellExecute, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting dynamic loading of malicious code. The embedded executable is the primary indicator of malicious intent, likely serving as a downloader or initial payload.

Heuristics 8

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • PEB API-hash resolver high SC_API_HASH_RESOLVER
    PEB access followed by ROR13-style API hashing, a common position-independent shellcode import resolver
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00003674.exe
2088fbb34b5a663a83e3447c266d8b07fd0bc18f232909791b185d982de433a5
embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x3674 254976 bytes