Sagent — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d368fee8aab5985b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

18.4 KB Created: 2020-10-12 16:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 3070372df9c8092ff90ff2465c98136f SHA-1: abdcc32f563b5e553f7cef253752e5328b9b5842 SHA-256: d368fee8aab5985b48b5ef78c07cebc3f31728d00efdd174e7fde84174cd779c
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Sagent · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. ClamAV signatures indicate this is a downloader for the Sagent family. The primary function appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as suggested by the ClamAV detection name.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9770108-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9770108-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
647ba9eb08d1dacb40b34a776a3de9fdf757e30ae4559342200e33768098f648
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3233 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
343eea0cf619f78d888aae1944af74bdbe24c670f9a222eacdaf64f18d40dba7
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9770108-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely