Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d3678d0496ffdce8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.7 KB Created: 2020-08-04 19:04:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6554ce3acbe7fb9dcd54246b0a8de72c SHA-1: 9376b70c977d2ae81658249130fe5b4ecf995e56 SHA-256: d3678d0496ffdce8ac7ec2b4434ba4f0df032861448a5ed768417a0728633aac
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body is heavily obfuscated and contains metadata indicating it was generated by wkhtmltopdf. The presence of a mass external PDF link farm suggests an attempt to manipulate search engine results or to distribute malicious content through a large number of seemingly benign documents.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=ftir+spectroscopy+principle+pdf
    • http://vunegoxa.fenceposttrading.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874524/pegexa-ribewowomezas-jezademalowi-gupidulanab.pdf
    • http://files.childemotionregulationlab.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384604/2940405.pdf
    • http://files.michaelbarryanderson.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857758/rejaruzaxofegadeti.pdf
    • http://files.hayfieldsecondarychoirs.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379280/46438b30b.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopi
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3631/0693/files/63468944900.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9848/1564/files/74088787212.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6910/3528/files/pimefunulefutasoditarana.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0792/5664/files/battleships_python_code.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8806/0321/files/destiny_ddos_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8938/5888/files/champions_return_to_arms.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7016/0032/files/58498815454.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1239/9010/files/27885018676.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7692/7141/files/25222706469.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1751/8751/files/fetorupobotoridukewa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5374/3270/files/urc-_8820-_cisco.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3019/2039/files/makemupi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3171/4199/files/33935409211.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/4146/5244/files/puvup.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008ca4.bin
268d1d2071fb9a6f17cef081f3a8d359dd149d6789c7c639c2ba352fc8a1acdd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8CA4 4996 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009dc2.bin
e08fe0ede95eff33f2e28b0957b9f2c944f705929e2ce2027970a7f48e7e5cd9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9DC2 10496 bytes