Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d35e6ec25facd1d3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

69.5 KB Created: 2021-10-27 10:31:49 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 082b9d01679a2d7e81a29a47f53bcc2b SHA-1: a52abd81d81c91895591c6792e2daa9033802efd SHA-256: d35e6ec25facd1d3e99cd2959afeccd20e3e5ba5f43e2b4b55210f1eb23acf29
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic for Applications T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The file contains Excel 4.0 macros, which are known to be used for malicious purposes. The macros utilize WinAPI functions such as URLDownloadToFileA to download files from the provided URLs. These URLs point to MP4 files, which are likely disguised payloads. The script's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload from these URLs.

Heuristics 4

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
  • URL reconstructed from XLM cell array (3 URLs) critical OOXML_XLM_CELL_ARRAY_URL
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet stages its payload URL across individual numeric cells (one ASCII charcode per cell) or inside an embedded HTA that uses VBScript Chr()/&-concat obfuscation. The reconstructed URL is invisible to literal-bytes URL extraction because it is never contiguous in the workbook stream. URLs were recovered by walking the BIFF12 record stream of every worksheet and macrosheet part and decoding RK/inline-string cells in both row-major and column-major order.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910251809556271117/912318007320145940/XOftdbhXmOZcuntfuck.mp4
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910251809556271117/912318020003692574/FqtFBvEOrukvcuntfuck.mp4
    • https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/910251809556271117/912318014416912415/XOwuRIcuntfuck.mp4

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin
074b099251021cdab692f0715ab7eece882e2f4b80d986a0bebe0580ca1806b5
xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 5389 bytes