PDF malware analysis — malicious · d359bc11c2cc5125

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.8 KB Created: 2020-07-31 11:29:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)

MD5: 163406c5eb235c6208ff39e0ae6bb64c SHA-1: f3f04e0b680b154233fc0e4245f438c07ab6bc40 SHA-256: d359bc11c2cc512566244b9d97bd7b2d992ca6033a0cab814d32c2e60ccb33be

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to a known malicious redirector. Another heuristic indicates the document is a lure for a password-protected archive, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The document body is heavily obfuscated but contains metadata related to PDF annotation and the authoring application, which is not directly indicative of malicious intent but supports the PDF context.

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE

Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=annotate+pdf+ibooks+ipad
- http://files.davidjonesdialogues.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874585/429e128d8d683.pdf
- http://files.bdwponds.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384121/fowexutorebal.pdf
- http://files.santaclaritaschool.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437308/9471656.pdf
- http://files.nnhst2.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379612/lufuxofuwusuwufaposi.pdf
- http://files.ifca.co/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710694/cb21c105724.pdf
- http://files.ifca.co/u
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/93527538138.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1411/1903/files/10490838045.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/79265304831.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0488/6166/files/60499362598.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8389/0850/files/doponuxamumosirelubamexum.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9508/9571/files/11198137182.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5366/2883/files/25626173677.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1479/7981/files/mizofu.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4303/6053/files/zukexuxukobufuwuvu.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9594/8454/files/texule.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/61086590007.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1541/3658/files/nisokaruw.pdf
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off00008a4c.bin` `e95e5a373c2127366996e2647947e8ab920d222da69abc4ac82bc071e410d5cc`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8A4C	4888 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off00009af4.bin` `29a630dc821a66e6f38d361c13ea305bfdb2bf3b34bcfdae3bdd643c60c7353d`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9AF4	10384 bytes

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